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Since the economic reforms of 1979, China has achieved remarkableeconomic growth that amounts to an annual average growth rate of9.9 percent in gross domestic product (GDP) from 1979 to 2010. (1)
A major impetus of China’s economic growth is based on the advantage of
its low labour costs. While the state has always striven for social stability,
employment creation has been the primary target. Low-value-added
labour-intensive processing industries are a quick means of increasing em-
ployment opportunities. However, the laws and regulations pertinent to
the labour market are not strongly enforced to protect the rights of work-
ers. Labour conflicts often subsequently develop into collective defiance.
For example, Ching-kwan Lee delineated a detailed discussion on the pro-
liferation of labour conflicts in Shenzhen, a special economic zone in
southern China, where labour grievances mainly stem from workplace
degradation, exploitation, and discrimination. (2) Anita Chan (1998) ex-
plained that labour rights are violated in many areas in China, viz. (i) the
lack of rights of migrant workers, (ii) forced and bonded labour, (iii) living
on below-subsistence wages, (iv) intimidation, physical violence, corporal
punishment, and control of bodily functions, and (v) lack of occupational
health and safety. (3) BBC Asia-Pacific News (2010) highlighted that poor
working conditions, lack of trade union representation, and unreasonably
low wages are the common reasons for strikes in China. (4) Nowadays,
workers can easily communicate through mobile phones and instant mes-
saging. Any discontent stemming from the above common causes of
labour grievance will quickly spread among workers. Therefore, it is not un-
common to see workers set up picket lines and organise demonstrations,
leading to possible social turmoil. (5)
Advancing into the twenty-first century, the Chinese government has re-
alised that economic development in the future should not only rely on
low-value-added, labour-intensive processing industries, and that job cre-
ation alone may not guarantee social stability. The government has there-
fore shifted its industrial development strategy to higher-technology-
based industrial production and stable employment relations in the longer
term for social cohesion and harmony. (6) Set against this background, the
Chinese government has promulgated the Labour Contract Law (hereafter
“the Law”) with the aim of clearly delineating and strengthening relations
between workers and firms, monitoring their behaviour, and creating ex-
plicit rights and obligations for both parties. Before the promulgation of
the Law, the Judiciary Committee of the Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People’s Congress reported that less than one fifth of enterprises had
signed labour contracts with their workers. (7) Even though some workers
had entered into labour contracts with their employers, many labour con-
tracts were rather informal. In those informal contracts, the basic rights of
labourers, including minimum wages, working conditions, working hours,
and social insurance provisions, were unclearly stated. Moreover, many
labourers could only engage in short-term or temporary contracts with
their employers. As such, their basic human rights were not adequately
protected. (8)
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In the process of soliciting public comments on the Law, the Chinese gov-
ernment openly called for non-Party reviews on the legislation of the Law. The
responses were very numerous, amounting to nearly 200,000 comments,
among which two-thirds came from ordinary workers. A large majority of the
comments were sent to the Chinese government through the Internet. (9)
Upon considering public feedback on the Law, the government amended the
content of the new Labour Contract Law three times, in December 2006, April
2007, and June 2007. At the 28th Session of the 10th Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress held in June 2007, the new Labour Contract
Law was passed, and the promulgation of the Law was scheduled to be effec-
tive from the first day of 2008. The highlights of the content of the Law in the
areas of fixed-term labour contracts, employee compensations upon termi-
nation or expiration of labour contract, salary issues during the probation pe-
riod, and obligations and penalties on enterprises when the Law has been vi-
olated, etc., are discussed in Section 2, below.
Since its implementation on 1 January 2008, the Law has aroused heated
debate. In particular, some corporate representatives have voiced strong
opposition that has been noted. As the Law in principle would likely in-
crease the labour costs of production, for example, by increasing the re-
quirements for severance pay and providing long-service workers with pro-
tection against dismissal, etc., many firms have reacted by, for instance,
planning to leave the Chinese market. Liisi Karindi reported:
According to the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, an estimated
10 per cent of the 60,000 – 70,000 factories owned by Hong Kong
entrepreneurs in Guangdong will close their doors in 2008. The Wall
Street Journal reported recently that some shoe companies in the
Pearl River Delta area have already closed. The Taiwan Merchant As-
sociation in Dongguan estimates that at least 200 Taiwanese-
owned businesses have left the area and more will probably be leav-
ing later this year… (10)
The scenario seemed dire:
… the Shanghai-based American Chamber of Commerce lobbied
hard against the employment security provisions in the proposed
law and won some last-minute concessions. But these were not
enough, claimed some employers, to prevent a wave of factory clo-
sures and threats of more among the most labour-intensive manu-
facturers of Guangdong Province. By one account 1000 footwear
and accessory producers had reduced output or closed up shop.
Some moved to the Chinese hinterland, others to Vietnam and
Burma, where labour was cheaper… (11)
In short, firms were concerned that the Law could exert grave impact by
raising labour costs, with deleterious effects on their cost competitiveness
and profit margins. Was the implementation of the Law really to blame for
the threatening phenomenon? Despite the on-going debate, empirical ev-
idence of the impact of the Law on corporate labour costs of production,
to the best of our knowledge, has lacked systematic academic research.
Against this background, the central question posed in this paper is to ex-
amine the extent to which implementation of the Law has affected the
labour costs of production. This paper focuses on this empirical question
by drawing upon a data set obtained from a field survey in late 2008 con-
ducted in Guangdong Province in southern China.
We will first introduce the statistical methods that examine the effects
of the Law on labour costs. Two approaches, namely direct and indirect
cost accounting methods, are adopted. Then, we will delineate the empir-
ical findings of the effects of the Law on labour costs. At the end, we will
provide some concluding remarks.
Statistical methods to determine the effects
of the Labour Contract Law on labour costs
To examine the effects of the Law on the corporate labour costs of pro-
duction, we adopted direct and indirect cost accounting methods in our
study. Subsequently, the effects of the Law on labour costs were compiled
into a range of percentiles.
Analysing the effects of the Law on labour costs by
using the direct cost accounting method
To proceed with the direct cost accounting method, we first conducted
a review of the main elements of the Law and compared them with other
relevant regulations on labour protection. Then, we designed a question-
naire on these pertinent regulations and issues in order to obtain relevant
financial and personnel data. Finally, we estimated the increase in labour
costs as well as the share of the increase in labour costs to the total labour
costs of production.
The direct effects on labour costs of implementation of the Law can be
grouped into three areas: direct increase in labour costs, regressive costs,
and costs of law violation. (12) The explanations are as follows.
Effects of the implementation of the Law on direct
increases in labour costs of firms
Direct increases in labour costs refer to (i) the economic compensa-
tion that a firm shall bear when a labour contract is terminated upon its
expiration (stipulated by the Law for the first time), and (ii) salary in-
creases during the probationary period. (13) The first component of a di-
rect increase in labour costs is the outcome from the economic com-
pensation as stipulated in Article 46 of the Law. The regulations under
the previous labour contract law allowed firms to hire workers for a
number of fixed-term contracts. In doing so, these firms would not have
to pay severance compensation to workers upon termination or expira-
tion of contract. According to Article 46 of the new law, workers with an
employment record of 10 years or more will receive adequate financial
compensation should they be made redundant. The economic compen-
sation is one month of basic salary per year of service with a ceiling that
amounts to 12 months of the basic salary. As for the employment terms
of workers, in the past, firms in China were inclined to hire a large num-
ber of temporary workers so they could avoid paying the benefits stip-
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ulated under regular employment terms. However, this seems to give
firms more flexibility in employment practices. (14) In the new law, tem-
porary workers who are paid hourly wages and work more than 24 hours
a week are to be treated as regular workers. All in all, these stipulations
place a greater financial burden on firms and aroused much more dis-
content.
The second component stems from Article 20 of the new regulations
in the Law, in that the standard salary during the probationary period
should be “not less than 80 percent” of the starting salary for regular
workers in the same position. Moreover, probationary periods are re-
duced to a maximum of two months from the previous six months be-
fore the implementation of the Law. (15)
The Law has not been in effect for an extended period of time. In the
future, when more labour contracts are terminated, the economic com-
pensation involved in this aspect can be expected to increase and result
in increasing operational costs for firms. Marginal firms may be elimi-
nated, leaving efficient firms to survive. The effect of the direct increase
in labour costs is likely to gradually wane over time.
Effects of the implementation of the Law on the
regressive costs of firms
The so-called “regressive costs” refer to the cost of regressive differ-
ences, including social security fees, a portion of which has usually not
been paid by firms. Before the promulgation of the Law, it was not un-
common for many firms to flout the state policy on paying the required
amount of social security fees. Yinhua Sha reported that in 1999, 49
state-owned enterprises out of a sampling of 100 enterprises in Jiangsu
and Sichuan provinces failed to pay social security fees in an amount to-
talling 64.82 million yuan. In Zhuzhou, Hunan Province, the collection
rate of social security fees was only recorded at 88.0 percent in 1997. (16)
The rate fell to 78.2 percent in the following year. In Hainan Province in
2000, as many as 2,760 firms failed to pay social security fees totalling
294.42 million yuan. Among others, one major reason was attributed to
the underdeveloped legal system in terms of enforcement. There was no
explicit legal provision to compel firms to pay social security fees. To rec-
tify the unfair treatment of employees that pertained to social security, a
serious call for the enactment of related laws was at the top of the gov-
ernment agenda. (17)
Article 17 of the Law requires firms to contribute to the social security
accounts of their employees, and they should fulfil their obligations
completely. The most apparent increase in regressive costs occurs in the
total expenditure on social insurance borne by firms. In the context of
China’s Social Security Law, the social security framework consists of five
areas of insurance, i.e., basic retirement, medical, work-related injuries,
unemployment, and maternity. The framework covers all employers and
employees. (18) Along with implementation of the Law, a firm must pay
social security fees in strict accordance with the stipulated rules. Article
38 of the Law stipulates that a firm failing to do so will face penalties. In
contrast, firms that did not pay the fees before the Law came into effect
will now incur higher labour costs when they fulfil their obligations to
pay the fees. Moreover, as regards the effects of regressive costs on
labour costs, attention should be drawn to the proportion of social insur-
ance costs in labour costs. Despite the increase in social insurance costs
incurred by firms, the proportion this increase represents in total labour
costs is not very apparent.
Effects of the implementation of the Law on corporate
cost of law violation
The corporate cost of law violation refers to costs arising from a firm’s vi-
olation of relevant provisions in the Law. Firms that violate the Law will be
heavily penalised. The cost of law violation does not apply to all firms.
Firms that have breached the Law will incur such costs, whereas firms that
comply with the requirements in labour employment under the Law do
not have to bear any cost of law violation. The cost of law violation mainly
includes the following aspects:
(a) According to Article 46 of the Law, if workers terminate their labour con-
tracts pursuant to Article 38 herein, the firm will financially compensate
the workers. If a firm violates Article 38, a worker can terminate the
labour contract, and the firm must pay compensation to the employee.
The compensation is calculated at a rate of one month’s wages for each
full year of service in the firm. Firms have to pay a penalty if they fail to
pay the social insurance of workers or overtime work wages in full.
(b) According to Article 87 of the Law, a firm must pay twice the required
severance to its workers if it violates the Law upon terminating a
labour contract. The required severance pay to a worker is based on
the number of years of service in the firm at the rate of one month’s
wages for each full year of service. As such, when violating the Law, a
firm will be penalised by paying its workers double the required sever-
ance. Given that the Law has not been implemented for a lengthy pe-
riod of time, the ratio of this expenditure borne by firms in terms of
total labour costs will not be high. However, possible hidden costs that
arise from such compensation could be a financial burden on firms. In
fact, workers in some large firms might instigate other workers to
cause problems in order to receive economic compensation. They
could make minor mistakes in their work to force the firm to termi-
nate their labour contracts, and thereby allow them to obtain eco-
nomic compensation. Firms that pay compensation to such workers
may experience potential problems of moral hazard.
(c) According to Article 82 of the Law, a firm pays double the wages each
month to its workers if it does not sign a labour contract with them
on time, or signs a labour contract with workers without an end date
for employment. Such a penalty payment will take effect from the
date on which the firm commenced employing them. If a firm follows
the guidelines and regulations and abides by the Law, then it will not
have to pay any costs incurred by law violation.
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In the context of using the direct cost accounting method to estimate the
effects of the Law on labour costs, some hidden costs could be neglected in
the estimate due to the difficulty of compilation. When hidden costs are not
taken into account, the results from the direct method are likely to be under-
estimated. For example, the implementation of the Law sets higher require-
ments for corporate management in human resources. The hidden costs that
a firm needs to bear include the demand for more human resources person-
nel to handle issues related to the Law in terms of modification and revision
of new rules and regulations and strengthening the mechanisms for the me-
diation and handling of labour disputes. Moreover, a firm needs to shoulder
the expense of training workers to understand the obligations and rights of
both the employer and the employees as stipulated by the Law.
Analysing the effects of the Law on labour costs by
the indirect cost accounting method
To study the effects of the Law on labour costs by the indirect cost ac-
counting method, we first examined the effects of an increase in minimum
wage and a normal increase in salary on the labour costs of a firm. We then
deducted the effects of these two factors from the total increase in labour
costs during the period of study. The residual increase in labour costs
would be the effects of the Law and other “unspecified factors” that are
neglected in our discussion on labour costs. (19) (20)
Effects of minimum wage adjustment on labour costs of
firms
China has implemented a minimum wage system with the objective of
enabling workers to survive and provide their families with basic necessi-
ties. The minimum wage system is important because it ensures that work-
ers will receive a reasonable amount of payment without exploitation by
employers. In the vast Chinese market, regional governments are given the
autonomy to determine and adjust the minimum wage levels in their lo-
calities, in order to cater to regional differences in social and economic de-
velopment, economic growth, unemployment, and cost of living. (21)
In China, many firms have adopted the minimum wage level as the basic
wage for their frontline workers. Adjustments to the minimum wage would
greatly affect the wages of frontline workers, and also result in labour cost
increases in firms. However, there is no obvious association between a
usual adjustment in minimum wage and the implementation of the Law.
Below is the formula for the statistical compilation of the effects of a min-
imum wage increase on a firm’s labour costs by the indirect method.
Effects of minimum wage on corporate labour costs
= [(average wages of frontline workers in the base period × num-
ber of frontline workers in the reporting period × adjustment of
minimum wage)/total corporate labour costs in the base period]
= {[total wages of frontline workers in the base period × (1 +
growth rate of number of frontline workers) × adjustment of
minimum wage]/total corporate labour cost in the base period}
Effects of a normal increase in salary on labour costs of
firms
When salary experiences an annual growth trend, it will inhibit some ef-
fects of the labour costs of firms. We consider that while the wages of
frontline workers are affected by a regular adjustment to the minimum
wage, non-frontline employees are all influenced by annual salary growth.
The effects of a normal increase in the salaries of non-frontline employees
on corporate labour costs can be calculated with the following formula:
Effects of a normal increase in salaries of non-frontline employees
on corporate labour costs
= {[(growth rate of monthly average salary of all employees in the
base period + 1) × average salary of non-frontline workers in the
base period x number of non-frontline employees during the re-
porting period - total salary of non-frontline employees in the
base period] /total labour cost in the base period}
= {[(growth rate of monthly average salary of all employees in the
base period + 1) × total salary of non-frontline employees in the
base period x (1 + growth rate of non-frontline employees) -
total salary of non-frontline workers in the base period]/total
labour cost in the base period}
When analysing the effects of the Law on labour costs by the indirect
method, we eliminate the effects of a minimum wage adjustment and the
annual growth of the average salary of all employees. The residual increase
in labour costs would be attributed to the effects of the Law and other un-
specified factors on corporate labour costs per capita. However, neither the
effects of the Law nor other unspecified factors on corporate labour costs
per capita can be isolated. Hence, using the indirect method will result in
over-estimates.
Analysing the effects of the Law on labour costs by
the range estimation method
We have examined the effects on labour costs of implementation of
the Law from two perspectives by using the direct and indirect cost ac-
counting methods. The direct method indicates that the effects are low,
whereas the indirect method indicates more significant effects. Neither
method used to examine the effects of the Law on the labour costs of
a firm indicates difficulties in identifying accurately estimated values
for empirical discussion. As such, it would be appropriate to compile a
range of percentiles of the estimated effects to serve as a benchmark
range, i.e., giving a range of the effects of the Law on labour costs. The
lower range is the result of the direct method of estimation, and the
upper range is that from the indirect method. Based on this, we could
effectively calculate the range of the effects of the Law on corporate
labour cost per capita in China, which would then facilitate policy eval-
uation.
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Statistical and empirical analysis of the
effects of the Law on labour costs
A set of data on firms collected in the Guangdong Province is used to es-
timate the effects of the Law on labour costs. Why did we choose Guang-
dong Province for our study? There are two main reasons. First, undertak-
ing empirical studies on data at the firm level in China is often contingent
on being able to gain access to firms. The local government units have
good access to firms, which made the collection of data more feasible
when help from the local government departments was available to re-
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Table 1 – Total number of firms in Guangdong Province in 2006 and the proportion of sampling
Locality Total number of firms Number of sample firms
Proportion of 
sample firms (%)
Guangdong Province 529,196 600 0.1134 
(a) Pearl River Delta
Guangzhou 106,879 80 0.0749
Shenzhen 96,287 80 0.0831
Dongguan 45,851 80 0.1745
Foshan 57,143 70 0.1225 
Zhongshan 21,663 50 0.2308 
Huizhou 22,410 30 0.1339 
(b) Eastern Guangdong Province 
Shantou 20,864 30 0.1438 
Heyuan 7,261 30 0.4132 
(c) Western Guangdong Province
Zhanjiang 13,311 30 0.2254 
Maoming 11,263 30 0.2664 
Zhaoqing 10,992 30 0.2729 
(d) Northern Guangdong Province
Shaoguan 10,480 30 0.2863 
Qingyuan 9,347 30 0.3210 
Sub-total of (a) to (d) 433,751 600 0.1383 
Source: Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, China, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2007. 
Table 2 – Classification of large, medium and small firms
Economic sector Indicator Unit Large Medium Small
Manufacturing
Employee
Sales
Total assets
Person
10,000 yuan
10,000 yuan
>2,000
>30,000
>40,000
300-2,000
3,000-30,000
4,000-40,000
<300
<3,000
<4,000
Construction
Employee
Sales
Total assets
Person
10,000 yuan
10,000 yuan
>3,000
>30,000
>40,000
600-3,000
3,000-30,000
4,000-40,000
<600
<3,000
<4,000
Wholesaling
Employee
Sales
Person
10,000 yuan
>200
>30,000
100-200
3,000-30,000
<100
<3,000
Retailing
Employee
Sales
Person
10,000 yuan
>500
>15,000
100-500
1,000-15,000
<100
<1,000
Transportation
Employee
Sales
Person
10,000 yuan
>3,000
>30,000
500-3,000
3,000-30,000
<500
<3,000
Hotel, 
food and beverage
Employee
Sales
Person
10,000 yuan
>800
>15,000
400-800
3,000-15,000
<400
<3,000
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics website, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/t20061018_402369829.htm (consulted in August 2011). 
searchers. Second, since China introduced economic reforms in 1979,
Guangdong Province has enjoyed a higher level of economic freedom than
other provinces. It is one of the provinces that have attracted the largest
amount of foreign direct investments into China.
In 2008, with financial support from the Guangdong Provincial Govern-
ment and the assistance of various government departments, including the
Guangdong Labour and Social Guarantee Bureau, Guangdong Statistical Bu-
reau, and the Guangdong Survey Brigade of the China National Bureau of
Statistics, we conducted an in-depth questionnaire survey across different
economic categories and industries in 13 major cities in the Pearl River Delta
and in the eastern, western, and northern regions of Guangdong Province.
The 13 cities are Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Foshan,
Shantou, Maoming, Heyuan, Zhaoqing, Shaoguan, Qingyuan, Zhanjiang, and
Huizhou. In terms of output, the contribution of these 13 cities to the total
GDP of Guangdong Province in 2009 was as great as 78 percent. (22)
In terms of the sampling in our survey, the number of firms established
in the 13 cities served as a base for the allocation of sample firms. To ob-
tain an acceptable representation of firms in each city, the minimum num-
ber of questionnaires to be collected from each of the 13 cities was set at
30. For large cities such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Dongguan, we sur-
veyed 80 firms in each city. Following these guidelines, the proportion of
samples is depicted in Table 1. The total number of questionnaires was 600.
There were 561 valid questionnaires completed through on-site visits.
Moreover, we collected 45 valid questionnaires from firms via the Internet.
In terms of the survey given to frontline workers, we interviewed five work-
ers randomly selected from each sample firm and obtained 2,922 valid
questionnaires. In our paper, a frontline worker is defined as an average
worker who directly engages in the production of goods or provision of
services. For instance, a frontline worker of a manufacturing firm typically
has to handle equipment for the assembling and processing of products. In
the first half of 2008, the minimum and average salaries of the workers in-
volved in our survey were 580 yuan and 1375.73 yuan, respectively. (23) Our
data set covered large, medium, and small firms comprising 15 percent, 60
percent, and 25 percent of the total sample, respectively. For the identifi-
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22. Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, China, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2010.
23. There were five statutory minimum wage levels ranging from 530 to 860 yuan a month imple-
mented in various regions in Guangdong Province in 2008. The minimum wage of 580 yuan was
adopted in ten cities, among which five were included in our sample regions: Heyuan, Zhanjiang,
Maoming, Zhaoqing, and Qingyuan. Retrieved on 6 August 2011 (http://wenku.baidu.com/
view/12499dbc960590c69ec37660.html).
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Table 3 – Analysis of the effects of the Labour Contract Law on the labour costs of production 
in 13 regions in Guangdong Province (Direct cost accounting method) (%)
Cost 
increase 
(a) 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07
(b) 2.57 2.03 2.24 3.23 2.59 2.50 1.62 1.57 2.61 2.19 2.24 1.46 1.66 2.03
(c) 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.21
(d) 2.72 2.20 2.48 3.45 2.82 2.68 1.90 1.67 2.77 2.58 2.36 1.55 1.92 2.31
(e) 2.54 2.06 2.32 3.28 2.66 2.51 1..75 1.57 2.60 2.41 2.20 1.46 1.80 2.17
(a) Ratio of direct increase in labour cost to total labour costs of firms; (b) Ratio of regressive cost to total labour costs of firms; (c) Ratio of cost of law violation to total labour costs of firms; (d) Ratio of cost in-
crease to total labour cost of firms (d=a+b+c); (e) Ratio of increase in total cost per capita due to the Law.
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Table 4 – Analysis of the effects of the Labour Contract Law on the labour costs of production in 13 regions
in Guangdong Province (Indirect cost accounting method) (%)
Cost 
increase 
(a) 16.13 15.35 14.25 19.91 15.39 16.25 16.08 14.17 17.26 14.81 14.07 14.93 13.48 13.56
(b) 4.64 4.13 0* 5.80 3.09 3.86 5.17 4.05 6.12 4.01 4.80 4.10 4.00 4.38
(c) 6.58 7.38 9.30 7.65 6.62 6.69 6.43 6.33 6.98 6.54 5.26 7.83 6.08 5.31
(d) 4.90 3.84 4.95* 6.47 5.68 5.70 4.48 3.79 4.16 4.26 4.01 3.00 3.40 3.88
1. (a) the total increase of labour costs per capita in firms; (b) the increase in labour cost per capita due to an increase in minimum wage; (c) the increase in labour cost per capita due to a normal increase in salary;
and (d) the increase in labour cost per capita due to the effects of the Law and other unspecified factors (d=a-b-c).
2. *The upward adjustment to the minimum wage level in Shenzhen was executed on 1 July 2008, which was very close to the time of our questionnaire survey. As a result, our survey data were not able to cater
to the effects of the increase in minimum wage on labour costs in firms in Shenzhen.
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cation of firm size, we followed the guidelines of classification of a large,
medium, and small firm adopted by the China National Bureau of Statis-
tics (Table 2). From the questionnaire survey, we were able to collect eco-
nomic data at the firm level in the first half of 2007 and the first half of
2008, which were labelled the base and the reporting periods, respectively.
The data included the costs of hiring workers, management, social security,
training, contract termination, etc. (24) The data were allocated to the three
types of cost instigated by the Law, i.e., direct increases in labour costs, re-
gressive costs, and cost of law violation. The results of our empirical study
based on the survey data are discussed below.
Empirical results of the effects of the Law on corporate
labour costs by using the direct cost accounting method
After analysing the field survey data from the 13 cities with the direct
method, we found that implementation of the Law has had limited effect
on corporate labour costs, as shown in Table 3. The results indicate that
the effects of the Law on corporate labour costs vary in different regions
of Guangdong Province. Dongguan City had the highest share of increase
in corporate total costs due to implementation of the Law relative to
total labour costs among the sample regions, amounting to 3.45 percent.
If the growth in the number of employees is removed as a factor, the ratio
of the increase in total cost per capita to the total labour cost is 3.28 per-
cent. This is the highest among all the sample regions. Qingyuan experi-
enced the smallest effects of the Law on the increase of corporate labour
costs, at a magnitude of 1.46 percent. The pertinent average effect is 2.54
percent.
Empirical results of the effects of the Law on corporate
labour costs by using the indirect cost accounting method
When the indirect method was applied to analyse the data set, we ob-
tained the effects of the Law and other unspecified factors on corporate
labour cost per capita. It was found that Dongguan City had the highest
share of increase in labour cost per capita due to implementation of the
Law and other unspecified factors relative to total labour costs, and was
the highest among the sample regions, with a record 6.47 percent.
Qingyuan recorded a 3.00 percent increase on corporate labour costs,
which was the smallest. On average, the pertinent effect of the Law on
raising corporate labour costs was 4.90 percent. The results are presented
in Table 4.
The range of the estimated effects
Based on the results presented in Tables 3 and 4, we re-compiled the
range of the estimated effects of the implementation of the Law on labour
costs of firms in the 13 cities, with the results shown in Table 5. The lower
end of the range is the result based on the direct cost accounting method,
while the upper end of the range is based on the indirect method. After a
comparison against the results in Table 5, we found that the effects of the
Law on labour costs of firms in our entire sample in Guangdong Province
were in the range of 2.54 percent to 4.90 percent. Dongguan City recorded
the largest effects of the Law, with a range of 3.28 percent to 6.47 percent,
whereas Qingyuan experienced the smallest pertinent effects, between
1.46 percent and 3.00 percent.
The empirical findings of an investigation on the effects of the Law on
corporate labour costs by economic sector, i.e., manufacturing, construc-
tion, wholesale and retailing in food and beverage, and services sectors in-
cluding hotel, travel, and entertainment, are shown in Table 6.
From Table 6, we find that among the four economic sectors, manufac-
turing firms experienced relatively large increases in corporate labour costs
per capita, which ranged from 2.80 percent to 5.76 percent, due to imple-
mentation of the Law as indicated by the higher values in both the lower
and upper bounds of the range.
Table 5 – Range of the effects of the Labour 
Contract Law on the labour costs of production 
in 13 regions in Guangdong Province (%)
City
Range of the 
effects of the
Labour Contract
Law on labour
cost per capita
(%)
City
Range of the 
effects of the
Labour Contract
Law on labour
cost per capita
(%)
Entire sample 2.54–4.90 Maoming 1.57–3.79
Guangzhou 2.06–3.84 Heyuan 2.60–4.16
Shenzhen 2.32–4.95 Zhaoqing 2.41–4.26
Dongguan 3.28–6.47 Shaoguan 2.20–4.01
Zhongshan 2.66–5.68 Qingyuan 1.46–3.00
Foshan 2.51–5.70 Zhanjiang 1.80–3.40
Shantou 1.75–4.48 Huizhou 2.17–3.88
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Table 6 – Range of the effects of the Labour 
Contract Law on the labour costs of production 
by economic sector in Guangdong Province (%)
Economic Sector
Range of the 
effects of the
Labour Contract
Law on labour
cost per capita
(%)
Entire sample 2.54–4.90
Manufacturing 2.80–5.76
Construction 2.05–3.24
Wholesale, retail, food 
and beverage
2.65–5.20
Services including hotel, travel, 
and entertainment
2.73–4.18
Source: Authors’ compilation.
24. It has to be noted that some enterprises may pretend to comply with government regulations.
If so, the cost of penalties reported in the survey would likely be on the low side of the actual
figures. The authors of this paper would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing atten-
tion to this point when interpreting the survey results.
25. Quoted in Yu-fu Chen and Michael Funke, “China’s New Labour Contract Law: No Harm to Em-
ployment?” op. cit., p. 568. Also see Alexandra Harney, “Bye Bye Cheap Labor,” Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 171, no. 2, March 2008, pp. 29-32.
26. Edward Wong, “Factories Shut, China Workers Are Suffering,” New York Times, 14 November
2008.
27. However, for some firms, a 2-4 percent increase in labour costs could be interpreted as quite sig-
nificant, in particular when the firms’ productions are labour-intensive.
28. The Economist produced a special report on the corporate social responsibility system. See The
Economist, “A Special Report on Corporate Social Responsibility,” vol. 386, no. 8563, 19-25 Jan-
uary 2008, p. 52 ff.
29. Among others, see Chatzis, who reviews the writings of Pierre Naville, a French sociologist. Kon-
stantinos Chatzis, “Rationalizing Maintenance Activities within French Industry During the Trente
Glorieuses, 1945-75,” Journal of History of Science and Technology, vol. 2, Fall 2008, pp. 75-138.
30. Yu-fu Chen and Michael Funke, “China’s New Labour Contract Law: No Harm to Employment?”
op. cit., p. 570.
31. Auret van Heerden “Impact of the Economic Crisis on China’s Labor Contract Law,” Global Action
Blog, 9 March 2009. Retrieved on 28 March 2011 (http://globalaction4fairlabor.wordpress.com/
2009/03/09/impact- of- the-economic-crisis-on-chinas-labor-contract-law).
32. Liisi Karindi, op. cit., p. 13. 
33. Alexandra Harney, op. cit., pp. 31-32; Shuguang Du, “Will the Implementation of Labor Contract
Law Trigger the Industrial Restructuring?” Shanghai Enterprise, vol. 12, 2007, pp. 5–7.
Explanations of the empirical findings
Along with rapid economic growth, firms in China experience increases
in the cost of production over time. A World Bank survey indicated that
payments to workers in China have increased significantly by 12 percent
each year since 2000, overtaking the relatively low single-digit growth rate
in the 1990s. Since the mid-2000s, the growth rate of wage payment has
overtaken productivity and thus diminished profit margins for firms. (25)
Since its implementation, many firms have attributed the increase in their
labour costs of production to the Law. Many firms have openly complained
about the Law. (26) However, such grievances are clouded by a paucity of
data and empirical evidence. According to our empirical study, the effects
of the Law on labour costs of firms in different regions in Guangdong
Province are not particularly large, incurring an increase in the corporate
labour cost per capita ranging between 2.54 and 4.90 percent. The results
suggest that implementation of the Law is not the primary source of in-
crease in the total cost of production in southern China. (27)
Immediately after implementation of the Law, many firms predicted that
it would exert grave impact on labour costs. Hence, their severe opposition
to the Law was not unexpected. Indeed, the Law aims to clarify the obli-
gations and rights of workers and firms, protect the lawful rights of work-
ers, and strengthen and stabilise labour relations, and consequently lays a
solid foundation for building a harmonious society. To achieve this target,
the Law has re-adjusted the pattern of vested interests among workers
and firms. Doing so may have exacerbated the interests of one or the other
party. This is the unavoidable price paid for implementing the Law. Modern
corporations, for instance those supporting corporate social responsibility,
are different from “sweatshops.” (28) The ultimate target of sweatshops is to
make profit, whereas that of many modern corporations is to achieve high
value for all stakeholders in the corporation. Sweatshops treat employees
as parts of a machine, whereas many modern corporations regard employ-
ees as their members. (29) Modern corporations also reflect their values by
practicing corporate social responsibility. In view of the current situation in
China, some articles in the Law are ahead of the current stage of industrial
relations. As a result, some firms have found it difficult to cope with the
Law’s provisions in the initial stage of implementation.
Concluding remarks
Since the launch of economic reform, China has achieved substantial
economic growth largely based on its advantage of low-cost production in
the labour market. Employment creation has always been the primary tar-
get of the state for the sake of maintaining social stability. While low-
value-added labour-intensive processing industries are able to support
more employment, the laws and regulations pertinent to the labour mar-
ket are not strongly enforced to protect the interests and rights of workers.
Advancing into the twenty-first century, the Chinese government has re-
alised that economic development in the future should not depend solely
on low-value-added labour-intensive processing industries, as low-skilled,
low-cost, and low-margin manufacturing productions are easily replace-
able. (30) Besides, if hundreds of millions workers are not adequately pro-
tected, job creation alone may not guarantee social stability. (31) Conse-
quently, the government has shifted its development strategy to high-level
technology-based industrial production and stable employment relation-
ships in the longer term for social cohesion and harmony. Against this
background, the Chinese government adopted the Labour Contract Law in
January 2008 in order to improve, strengthen, and stabilise employment
relations.
During the initial stage of implementation of the Law in 2008, many did
not see its benefits. Many firms reacted strongly, indicating that the Law
would have grave impact on their production and oblige them to leave the
Chinese market. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of workers
would be thrown out of jobs and find themselves unemployed, which
would threaten social stability. Could the Law actually cause such con-
cern? This paper was an attempt to empirically study the effects of the
Law on corporate labour costs by employing a data set collected in various
cities in Guangdong Province. Our findings suggest that the increased
labour costs per capita due to the effects of the Law do not appear to be
economically significant, falling into a range of 2.54 to 4.90 percent. This
empirical evidence refutes the concern and discontent of firms regarding
the impact of the Law on their labour costs of production. Although the
current study results are drawn from a survey conducted in Guangdong
Province, the findings should be of interest to firms and government de-
partments in other localities as well.
Nonetheless, would the exit of some firms from the Chinese market
threaten social stability? Liisi Karindi acknowledged that
… this outcome might well be the indirect aim of the Chinese Gov-
ernment. According to Wen Jiabao’s speech at a press conference on
the 11th Five-Year Plan, China will prohibit, punish and close down
energy wasting and highly polluting enterprises. Most of the labour-
intensive production companies, for example in the manufacturing
sector, belong to this category… (32)
In fact, many firms that have left the Chinese market are involved in low-
end manufacturing. (33) While the underlying motivation for the Labour
Contract Law is to protect and strengthen employment relations for the
sake of social stability in the longer term, its implementation could trigger
a re-structuring of China’s industrial sector.
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